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Abstract
This paper examines how di⁄erent unionisation structures a⁄ect ￿rms￿innovation incen-
tives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing
degree of centralisation: (1) ￿Decentralisation￿where wages are determined independently
at the ￿rm-level, (2) ￿coordination￿where one industry union sets individual wages for all
￿rms, and (3) ￿centralisation￿ where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all
￿rms. While ￿rms￿investment incentives are largest under ￿centralisation,￿investment in-
centives are non-monotone in the degree of centralisation: ￿Decentralisation￿carries higher
investment incentives than ￿coordination.￿ Labour market policy can spur innovation by
decentralising unionisation structures or through non-discrimination rules.
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1How unions a⁄ect ￿rms￿performance, innovation and labour productivity is a highly con-
troversial issue (for a survey see, e.g., Flanagan, 1999). On the one hand, unions are argued to
hurt ￿rms as unionisation may increase wage demands and, thereby, ￿rms￿labour costs (see,
e.g., Oswald, 1985; Farber, 1986; Hirsch, 1991). On the other hand, unions are regarded as part
of a constructive labour market regime which smoothens industrial relations, thereby promoting
labour productivity and lowering average costs (see Freeman and Medo⁄, 1984). In general
though, it is not the mere existence of unions that is decisive for ￿rms￿performance, but rather
the speci￿c mode of labour market organisation (see, e.g., Calmfors and Dri¢ ll, 1988; Soskice,
1990; Layard et al., 1991).
Labour markets di⁄er substantially between countries.1 A salient dimension that di⁄erenti-
ates national unionisation structures is the degree of wage setting centralisation (Calmfors and
Dri¢ ll, 1988; Moene and Wallerstein, 1997; Flanagan, 1999; Wallerstein, 1999). At the industry
level, a decentralised wage setting structure is commonly contrasted with a completely cen-
tralised one. While in the former case, wages are set between a single employer and a ￿rm-level
union, in the latter case an industry union negotiates a standard wage for the entire industry.
An important feature of centralised agreements is their egalitarian nature, as they usually do
not account for di⁄erences between ￿rms, so that ￿rms have to pay the same wage rate for the
same kind of labour. This feature is also mirrored in cross-country studies, which consistently
report lower wage dispersion for countries with centralised wage bargaining, as in Scandinavia,
and much higher wage dispersion for economies with decentralised wage setting systems, as e.g.,
in Japan and North America (see Freeman, 1988; Freeman and Schettkat, 2000).
The rigidities associated with centralised wage setting have recently come under attack in
the policy debate over labour market organisation and economic performance. A commonly held
view is that labour market rigidities are generally bad for overall economic performance (see,
for example, Nickell, 1997, and Siebert, 1997), so that any move towards more decentralised
and, hence, more ￿ exible structures is good for employment and overall economic prosperity.
Consistent with this view, the OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1996, p. 15) recommends to ￿make
wage and labour costs more ￿ exible by removing restrictions that prevent wages from re￿ ecting
local conditions (...).￿
1There exists a large literature about the possible key characteristics that are crucial for the relative perfor-
mance of di⁄erent modes of labour market organisation. For comparisons of countries￿labour market institutions
see, e.g., Nickell (1997), OECD (1997, c 3), Blau and Kahn (1999), and Wallerstein (1999).
2Given this policy recommendation, tendencies to introduce more ￿ exibility into centralised
wage systems have given rise to intermediate structures, which allow for adjustments to local
conditions at the ￿rm-level even though wage setting remains under the auspices of an indus-
try union. For example, in Germany collective wage agreements between industry unions and
employer associations have started to contain so-called ￿opening clauses￿ according to which
￿rms are allowed to pay wages below the collectively agreed rate under certain conditions (see
Sachverst￿ndigenrat, 1998, pp. 117-27). While in Germany industry unions￿successfully pro-
tected their monopoly power at the industry level, trends towards less centralised wage setting
in other countries, as, e.g. Denmark, Sweden, or New Zealand, have led to more decentralised
wage setting at the ￿rm-level and, thereby, substantially reduced unions￿monopoly power.2
Motivated by the institutional diversity of industry unionisation and by recent trends towards
more ￿ exible wage setting regimes, this paper analyses how various unionisation structures
that di⁄er in the degree of wage centralisation a⁄ect ￿rms￿incentives for implementing labour
productivity enhancing technologies and, as a consequence, overall industry employment.
Most of the existing theoretical work on the relationship between unionisation and innov-
ative activity has focused on the e⁄ects that union bargaining power and objectives have on
￿rms￿incentives to invest and to cut labour costs. Following the standard incomplete contracts
approach, the conventional wisdom has been that ￿rms￿investment incentives are decreasing
with union bargaining power, as unions have incentives to hold up innovative ￿rms and demand
higher wages once an investment is sunk so as to appropriate parts of the rent, which in turn
leads ￿rms to invest less (see Grout, 1984; Van der Ploeg, 1987; for a survey, Malcomson, 1997;
and Van Reenen, 1986, for empirical evidence). More recent work by Tauman and Weiss (1987)
and Ulph and Ulph (1994, 2001) has quali￿ed this underinvestment result, however, by consid-
ering the strategic aspects of oligopolistic competition between ￿rms (for a survey, see Ulph and
Ulph, 1998). Overall these papers have shown that ￿rms that face strong unions may enjoy a
strategic advantage vis-￿-vis those competitors that either pay competitive wages or that face
weaker unions. In such an environment, unionisation can increase the concerned ￿rm￿ s incentives
2For a country-wise survey of recent trends towards more ￿ exible wage setting see, e.g., Katz (1993). For
Australia see in particular Wailes and Lansbury (1999). The breakdown of centralised wage bargaining in Denmark
and Sweden is documented in Iversen (1996). The Swedish case has also been extensively studied by Hibbs and
Locking (2000). For the period from 1950 to 1992, a more conservative view is expressed in Wallerstein et al.
(1997).
3to innovate, and hence, its overall competitiveness.
As this literature has focused exclusively on decentralised modes of wage setting, where wages
are set by independent unions at the ￿rm-level, the relative performance of more centralised wage
setting systems remains an open issue, even though the degree of wage centralisation has been
identi￿ed as a crucial feature of di⁄erent unionisation structures. Our concern is, therefore, the
relative performance of di⁄erent unionisation structures as measured by their impact on ￿rms￿
innovation incentives and on overall industry employment.
For this purpose, we develop a framework that allows us to analyse how the degree of wage
centralisation a⁄ects both the hold-up problem associated with unionisation and the strate-
gic interaction between ￿rms. The basic set-up follows Ulph and Ulph (1994) and analyses a
unionised oligopoly model, where two ￿rms are racing to be the ￿rst to introduce an exclusive
new technology. Once the innovation has been implemented and the according investment is
sunk, wages are determined within a given unionisation structure. Finally, ￿rms compete in
Cournot fashion in the product market.
To analyse how di⁄erent unionisation structures a⁄ect innovation incentives three modes of
unionisation are distinguished with an increasing degree of centralisation: (1) ￿Decentralisation￿
where wages are determined independently at the ￿rm-level, (2) ￿coordination￿where an indus-
try union sets individual wages for all ￿rms at the ￿rm-level, and (3) ￿centralisation￿where a
uniform wage rate is set for the entire industry. As we will show, ￿rms￿investment incentives are
largest under ￿centralisation￿and smallest under ￿coordination￿ . Hence, investment incentives
are not monotone in the degree of centralisation, as ￿decentralisation￿carries higher investment
incentives than ￿coordination￿ . The intuition behind this result is that ￿coordination￿allows
the monopoly union to fully exploit its hold-up potential by setting discriminating wages for the
two ￿rms. In contrast, ￿centralisation￿and ￿decentralisation￿both constrain the unions￿power
either through the uniformity rule or through competition between ￿rm level unions. Overall,
our analysis shows that the uniformity rule is more e⁄ective in constraining the union￿ s hold-up
potential than the competitive threat resulting from decentralisation. Hence, the positive e⁄ect
that centralisation can have on ￿rms￿innovation incentives may possibly serve as an e¢ ciency
defence for labour market rigidities that con￿ne a strong industry union to an ￿equal pay for
equal work￿policy.
Regarding employment, ￿decentralisation￿yields the most favourable outcome, while either
4￿coordination￿or ￿centralisation￿perform worst in this regard. Given these results concerning
innovation incentives and employment, our analysis has two potentially important policy impli-
cations: First, any institutional change from a centralised structure towards a less centralised
system that does not constrain the union￿ s monopoly power at the industry level should be
critically reviewed, especially if it opens the window for more wage discrimination, which should
have negative e⁄ects on ￿rms￿innovation incentives. Second, even if decentralisation is a feasible
policy option, policy makers are still confronted with the trade-o⁄between innovation incentives
and employment. While ￿centralisation￿is most conducive for innovation incentives, industry
employment is largest when wages are determined at the ￿rm level under a decentralised wage
setting regime.
These results also relate to arguments that have been put forward in the Swedish debate
over ￿solidaristic￿ bargaining (Rehn, 1952) and that have been recently formalised in Agell
and Lommerud (1993) and Moene and Wallerstein (1997). According to this literature, nation-
wide wage settlements that are associated with a high degree of wage equality drive ine¢ cient
￿rms o⁄ the market and expedite structural change, thereby fostering growth. In contrast, our
analysis focuses on the role that di⁄erent unionisation structures can have in overcoming the
hold-up problem associated with unionisation in oligopolistic industries. Moreover, we do not
only analyse the polar cases of centralised and decentralised wage setting institutions, but also
consider an intermediate degree of centralisation.
The rest of this paper is now organised as follows: In Section 1 we introduce the model￿ s
structure and de￿ne the unionisation structures. We solve the model for the static case where
￿rms￿productivity levels are given in Section 2. Section 3 solves for ￿rms￿innovation incentives
and compares our results to innovation incentives in perfectly competitive labour markets. In
Section 4 we discuss implications for labour market policy before Section 5 ￿nally concludes.
1 The Model and Unionisation Structures
Let us consider a homogeneous goods Cournot duopoly with two ￿rms i = 1;2. Both ￿rms
operate under constant returns to scale, with labour being the only factor of production. To
produce a unit of the ￿nal good each ￿rm i requires ￿i units of homogeneous labour so that ￿rm
i￿ s marginal cost is given by ￿iwi, where wi denotes the wage rate that ￿rm i has to pay. Also
let qi denote the quantity of the ￿nal good produced by ￿rm i, and let li be its labour demand.
5Since ￿rm i requires ￿i units of labour per unit of output, it follows that li = qi￿i. We assume
a linear inverse demand function of the standard form p = A ￿ q1 ￿ q2, for q1 + q2 ￿ A.
Suppose that initially the two ￿rms are identical and have the same labour productivity,
1=￿1 = 1=￿2, which we normalise to unity. Then both ￿rms engage in a patent race where
each ￿rm has the same chance of being the ￿rst to ￿nd an innovation that reduces its labour
requirement per unit of output by ￿, (￿ > 0). The cost of implementing the innovation is
exogenous and will be denoted by I(￿) > 0. Once the innovation is implemented and the
according cost sunk, the ￿rm￿ s labour productivity increases instantaneously. The values of ￿
and I(￿) are commonly known before ￿rms decide about participating in the tournament. As
I is the price that has to be paid in order to implement a productivity enhancing technology, it
also measures how severe the hold-up problem is that the investing ￿rm faces under unionisation.
If an innovation does not involve any speci￿c investment, I is zero and, accordingly, the hold-
up problem vanishes. Conversely, as I becomes larger the hold-up problem becomes more
severe, and the speci￿c mode of unionisation becomes a critical determinant of ￿rms￿investment
incentives.
The opportunity cost of labour, given through the workers￿outside option such as their
alternative income, is denoted by w0, with w0 > 0. It is assumed that the union maximises its
members￿wage bill relative to the opportunity cost of labour, and we adopt the right-to-manage
assumption: The union can set the wage while ￿rms retains the right to choose their employment
level.3
We consider a three stage game with the following timing: In the ￿rst stage, both ￿rms
decide whether or not to participate in an R&D tournament, where the two ￿rms have the
same chance of obtaining the exclusive right to an innovation, I(￿), through which the labour
requirement per unit of output can be reduced by ￿, if the ￿rm implements the technology at
a cost of I. In the second stage, wages are determined, and we distinguish three unionisation
structures ￿ = D;C;U with the following properties:
1. Decentralisation (￿ = D): There are two ￿rm-level unions which set ￿rm-level wages w1
3In contrast to the right-to-manage assumption e¢ cient bargaining models assume that unions and ￿rms
bargain over both wages and ￿rms￿employment levels (Oswald and Turnbull, 1985; Layard et al., 1991; and
Booth, 1995). While unions usually neither have perfect monopoly power nor do they exclusively care about
their members￿wage bill, these simplifying assumptions allow us to concentrate exclusively on the e⁄ects of wage
setting rigidities.
6and w2 for their ￿rms. The two unions choose their wage demands simultaneously and
noncooperatively.
2. Coordination (￿ = C): An industry union coordinates the wage demands w1 and w2 so as
to maximise the industry wage bill.
3. Centralisation (￿ = U): There is one industry-wide union which sets a uniform industry
wage w for both ￿rms so as to maximise the industry wage bill.
Finally, in the third stage of the game the two ￿rms compete in quantities, taking productivity
levels and wage rates as given.
This timing of the game is intended to re￿ ect the planning horizon usually associated with
the respective decisions. Investment decisions are mostly long-run while wage contracts are
usually negotiated for a much shorter time horizon, and product market quantities can usually
be adjusted on an even shorter basis.
The three unionisation structures di⁄er with respect to the degree of wage centralisation in
the following way: The D-regime can be viewed as the most decentralised system of collective
wage setting, where ￿rm-level unions do not cooperate and set ￿rm-speci￿c wages depending on
the relative e¢ ciency of their employer. In contrast, the U-regime stands for the most centralised
wage setting system, as labour supply is perfectly monopolised and the industry union determines
one uniform wage for all ￿rms in the industry. This regime embodies the famous union-slogan
￿equal pay for equal work￿and is, therefore, the most egalitarian one. The C-regime lies in
between those polar cases. On the one hand labour supply is completely monopolised, as an
industry union coordinates wage demands at the ￿rm level. On the other hand ￿rm-level wages
are adjustable to the ￿rms￿relative competitiveness. Consequently, di⁄erent wages are likely
to prevail in this case. We take the C-regime as re￿ ecting recent trends in continental Europe
towards ￿ exible wage setting, while the union￿ s monopoly power remains largely intact (see also
OECD, 1997, for a summary of recent trends in this regard).
At this point two remarks about the multidimensional character of wage centralisation are
at hand: Firstly, our notion of centralisation requires either an industry union or intense coop-
eration among ￿rm-level unions to assure maximisation of the industry wage bill. Secondly, a
completely centralised regime further embodies an egalitarian wage rule by which ￿wage ￿ exi-
bility￿between ￿rms is suppressed.
7Before we compare the di⁄erent regimes, let us introduce the following assumption in order
to exclude corner solutions in which the non-innovating ￿rm is driven o⁄ the market:4
Assumption 1. The labour productivity enhancing innovations under consideration lead to
non-drastic productivity improvements in the sense that the union prefers the less e¢ cient ￿rm
to remain active in the market even under the most centralised wage setting regime U; i.e.,
w0 < w0 ￿
(1 ￿ 3￿)A
1 ￿ ￿2 ; (1)
which implies that we restrict attention to productivity increases ￿ < 1=3.
Assumption 1 ensures that all optimisation problems in the second and third stage of the
game stay globally concave. We maintain Assumption 1 throughout the rest of the paper.
2 The Static Case: Given Productivity Levels
Let us begin our analysis by solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium quantities and wages,
taking ￿rms￿productivity levels as given. We suppose that ￿rm 1 is the innovating ￿rm, so that
its labour requirement per unit of output is reduced by ￿. Firm 1￿ s pro￿t function is then given
by
￿1 = (A ￿ q1 ￿ q2)q1 ￿ w1(1 ￿ ￿)q1:
Firm 2 is the non-innovating ￿rm, and its pro￿t function is
￿2 = (A ￿ q1 ￿ q2)q2 ￿ w2q2:
Maximising ￿rms￿pro￿ts for given wages w1 and w2, and solving the ￿rst order conditions, we
obtain the ￿rms￿optimal strategies
q1(w1;w2;￿) =




A ￿ 2w1 + w2(1 ￿ ￿)
3
: (3)
We now turn to the wage setting stage. Wage-bill maximisation implies that the union￿ s optimal
wage setting strategy, w
￿









j) for i = 1;2, i 6= j,
4Assumption 1 is derived in the Appendix. Similar restrictions are also employed in Ulph and Ulph (1994,
1998, 2001).
8for regimes ￿ = U;C;D, where UD
i = li(wi ￿ w0), UC
i =
P2
i=1 li(wi ￿ w0), and UU
i =
P2
i=1 li(w ￿ w0) stand for the wage bills under the respective regimes, while labour demands







2, between the two ￿rms across the three di⁄erent regimes, we
obtain the following orderings:5




2, and the wage
di⁄erential, d
￿
w, under the di⁄erent unionisation structures ￿ = U;C;D are as follows:
(i) Firm 1￿ s wages: wC
1 > wU > wD
1 ,
(ii) Firm 2￿ s wages: wU > wC
2 > wD
2 ,




Proposition 1 shows how wage setting depends on the particular mode of unionisation. De-
centralised wage setting (￿ = D) leads to the lowest wage levels compared to more centralised
structures. Under coordinated wage setting (￿ = C) a positive wage di⁄erential results with
the e¢ cient ￿rm paying the highest wage. However, the wage di⁄erential under regime C is
lower than under system D. The ordering of the wage di⁄erentials mirrors our notion of wage
setting centralisation as discussed above. Wage setting under the decentralised regime D is most
responsive to ￿rms￿characteristics, so that productivity di⁄erences between ￿rms translate into
the largest wage di⁄erentials. At the other end of the spectrum, centralised wage setting under
regime U completely suppresses the wage gap.6
The ordering of wage di⁄erentials under the unionisation structures re￿ ects the empirical
￿nding that wage dispersion is negatively correlated with wage centralisation, which is docu-
mented in Rowthorn (1992), OECD (1997), Flanagan (1999), and Wallerstein (1999). Interest-
ingly, even though the intermediate regime C and the decentralised regime D both allow for full
wage ￿ exibility at the ￿rm-level, the wage pro￿le is more compressed under regime C than under
D. This is because under decentralised wage setting the union of the less e¢ cient ￿rm is willing
to accept a lower wage in order to restall its ￿rm￿ s competitiveness in the product market. In
contrast, an industry union fully internalises the negative ￿business stealing￿externality of this








2) are stated in Lemmas 1 and 2 in
the Appendix.
6It should be noted that centralised wage agreements often establish wage ￿ oors where ￿rms may decide to
pay higher wages. This may be explained by e¢ ciency wage considerations or other frictions in labour market
contracting that are beyond the scope of this paper.
9policy. Hence, under a coordinated wage setting regime (C) the union￿ s incentive to adjust the
non-innovating ￿rm￿ s wage to a lower level in response to an increase in the innovating ￿rm￿ s
productivity is much weaker.7
Proposition 1 also helps us to explore how the severity of the hold-up problem varies under
the three unionisation structures. Noting that ￿i = (qi)2 holds in equilibrium and using equation
(2), we can also write ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿ts as
￿1(w1;dw;￿) = [A ￿ w1(1 ￿ 2￿) ￿ dw]
2 =9: (4)
This expression of the innovator￿ s pro￿t allows us to identify two di⁄erent hold-up mechanisms.
Firstly, ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿t is reduced as its wage level, w1, increases, and secondly, the pro￿t decreases
as the wage di⁄erential between the two ￿rms widens. Hence, there are two kinds of hold-up:
1. Wage-level hold-up: An increase in the innovating ￿rm￿ s wage level - while holding the wage
di⁄erential constant - unambiguously reduces the gains from innovation; i.e. @￿1=@w1 < 0.
2. Wage-di⁄erentiation hold-up: An increase in the wage di⁄erential - while holding the
innovating ￿rm￿ s wage level constant - unambiguously reduces the gains from innovation;
i.e. @￿1=@dw < 0.
While the ￿rst kind of hold-up has received some attention in the respective literature, the
second way of rent extraction seems to be much less recognised. From Proposition 1 we see
that the wage-level hold-up is largest under regime C and lowest under regime D. This ordering
may suggest that decentralised wage setting is the mode of labour market organisation that is
most conducive to innovation. However, as part (iii) of Proposition 1 reveals, decentralised wage
setting also involves the largest hold-up potential via wage-di⁄erentiation. This may counter
the positive e⁄ects of lower wage levels on innovation incentives.
Comparison of regimes C and U shows that both the innovating ￿rm￿ s wage rate and the
wage di⁄erential are strictly smaller under regime U than under C. Hence, the uniformity rule
under centralised wage setting restricts the union￿ s hold-up potential and, therefore, should
induce larger innovation incentives. Comparison with the decentralised wage setting regime,
however, remains ambiguous so far. While under regime D the wage level is the lowest, it also
involves the largest scope for hold-up via wage di⁄erentiation.
7Accordingly, from Lemma 1 (Appendix) it follows that @w
D
2 =@￿ < @w
C
2 =@￿.
10It is also instructive to compare the wage outcomes under the unionisation structures with
a perfectly competitive labour market outcome. Clearly, with perfect competition in the labour
market, wages are forced down to workers￿reservation wage, w0. Quite obviously, unionisation
always implies higher wage levels. Similarly, union monopoly power also implies positive wage
di⁄erentials except for the centralised case, where the uniformity rule suppresses any inter-￿rm
wage di⁄erential as does a perfectly competitive labour market. While one might conclude from
these observations that innovation incentives are highest under a perfectly competitive labour
market, we will show below that such a conclusion is premature with respect to a centralised
wage setting regime.
Before turning to ￿rms￿innovation decisions, let us shortly examine the e⁄ects that the
di⁄erent unionisation structures have on employment at the industry level. These e⁄ects are
summarised in the following proposition:





2, under the di⁄erent unionisation structures ￿ = U;C;D are LC = LU < LD.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 broadly mirrors the wage ordering as stated in Proposition 1. As the two
￿rms￿wages are lowest, overall employment is largest under regime D. Interestingly enough,
total employment is the same under regimes U and C for given productivity levels.
3 The Dynamic Case: Productivity Improvements
3.1 Innovation Incentives
In the ￿rst stage of the game, the two ￿rms decide whether or not to participate in an R&D
tournament, in which both ￿rms have the same chance of winning the exclusive patent right
to a labour productivity enhancing innovation. Both ￿rms are certain about the productivity
gain, indicated by the reduction in labour requirement per unit of output, ￿, and the cost,
I(￿), which has to be sunk in order to implement the innovation. Accordingly, given that both
￿rms participate in the tournament, the expected pro￿t from participating in the tournament is
(1=2)[￿1(￿) + ￿2(￿) ￿ I(￿)], where ￿1(￿) denotes the pro￿t of the innovating ￿rm (i.e., the
patent right holder), while ￿2(￿) stands for the losing ￿rm￿ s pro￿t (as both ￿rms are equally
likely to win the race we can assign the innovation to ￿rm 1 without loss of generality). Each
11￿rm chooses to participate in the tournament as long as the expected pro￿t is higher than the
certain pro￿t from unilaterally abstaining, given by ￿2(￿), (note that in this case the rival ￿rm
would obtain the patent for sure). As we abstract from any R&D costs that have to be spent
in the course of the patent race, both ￿rms will participate in the race for the innovation if the
gain from participation, ￿, is larger than the implementation costs, I; i.e.
￿(￿) := ￿1(￿) ￿ ￿2(￿) > I(￿):
The value ￿(￿) measures the maximum willingness to pay for implementing a labour productiv-
ity enhancing innovation, ￿, and therefore, also each ￿rm￿ s incentive to participate in the patent
tournament. If this value is smaller than the cost that has to be sunk in order to implement the
innovation, then neither ￿rm has an incentive to participate in the R&D tournament.8;9
The following proposition states the main result regarding ￿rms￿innovation incentives:
Proposition 3. For any given ￿ > 0, the ￿rms￿innovation incentives, ￿(￿), are largest
under unionisation structure U and smallest under structure C; i.e. the ordering ￿U > ￿D >
￿C holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that di⁄erent unionisation structures have di⁄erent e⁄ects on innova-
tion incentives. Our ordering of unionisation structures along the dimension of wage central-
isation shows that a completely centralised wage setting system carries the largest innovation
incentives. Furthermore, the relationship between wage centralisation and innovative activity
is non-monotone. Innovation incentives are lowest when centralisation is intermediate; i.e. if
an industry union can di⁄erentiate wages across ￿rms as under ￿coordination￿ . This means
8Our speci￿cation of the R&D tournament gives rise to the same incentives to innovate as in Ulph and Ulph￿ s
(1994) model, where two ￿rms bid for the exclusive right to an innovation, which is auctioned o⁄ by an innovator
with zero reservation price. However, as the innovation is already available, their set-up does not address the
hold-up problem, which is at the core of our analysis. While the innovation is always implemented in Ulph and
Ulph (1994), positive implementation costs may result in a non-innovation outcome in our model.
9Alternatively, we may also assume that only one ￿rm, say ￿rm 1, has the opportunity to implement the
innovation. In this case, a ￿rm￿ s incentive to innovate would be given by the pro￿t di⁄erential ￿1(￿) ￿ ￿1(0),
where ￿1(0) stands for ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿t when neither ￿rm implements the innovation (see Bester and Petrakis, 1993,
for this approach). As we have shown in Haucap and Wey (2002), all our results are qualitatively robust in this
regard.
12that while the wage-di⁄erentiation hold-up is less severe under intermediate centralisation than
under decentralisation (as the wage structure is more compressed), the magnitude of the wage-
level hold-up under intermediate centralisation outweighs this. Overall, the hold-up problem is
therefore larger under intermediate centralisation, so that intermediate centralisation provides
the smallest innovation incentives among the three regimes.10
The ￿rst ￿nding has important implications for empirical work on the relationship between
unionisation and productivity or innovation. Starting with the seminal work of Brown and
Medo⁄ (1978) there is a large body of empirical literature studying the e⁄ects of unionisation
on productivity and innovation (see, e.g., Freeman and Medo⁄, 1984; Connolly et al., 1986;
Addison and Hirsch, 1989; Hirsch, 1991; Bronas and Deere, 1993; Addison and Wagner, 1994).
While empirical studies from North America tend to report negative impacts of unions on R&D,
European studies do not ￿nd these negative e⁄ects. All in all the empirical results are mixed:
There is no unambiguous relation between union power (measured by union density or union
coverage) and innovation activities (for surveys see Menezes-Filho et al., 1998, and Menezes-Filho
and Van Reenen, 2003). This may possibly also be due to the fact that much of the empirical
work has focused on union coverage and union density as measures of unionisation. As our
results indicate, the degree of centralisation in the wage setting process can also signi￿cantly
a⁄ect ￿rms￿innovative behaviour.
Our second ￿nding, namely that investment incentives are non-monotone with respect to cen-
tralisation, calls for a critical reassessment of recent trends towards more ￿ exibility in industry-
wide wage settlements. As these agreements often remain highly coordinated on the union￿ s side
we ￿nd that ￿ exibility can also adversely a⁄ect innovation incentives while the desired positive
e⁄ects on employment may remain small or even negligible as long as labour supply remains
monopolised. Before we elaborate on this issue in Section 4 let us now shortly examine the
employment implication at the industry level when innovation is endogenous. Comparison of
the industry level employment e⁄ects yields the following result:
10As one referee suggested, the unionisation structures may also be ordered di⁄erently so that union strength
is interpreted as being largest under regime C and smallest under regime D. While we agree that there is some
arbitrariness in ranking the di⁄erent unionisation structures, our ordering (according to wage di⁄erentials) is in
line with the empirical work cited above. Moreover, ranking regimes U and D with respect to union power is
di¢ cult if the industry wage bill (namely, the ability to extract rents from ￿rms) is used as a measure for union
power, as the wage bill can be larger under regime D than under regime U.
13Proposition 4. Consider any I(￿) with ￿ > 0. Then, in the long run, when ￿rms￿
innovation decisions are endogenous, industry employment levels are ordered as follows:
(i) If ￿U(￿) > I(￿) > ￿C(￿) holds, i.e. when the innovation is undertaken under the
centralised regime (￿ = U), but not under the coordinated regime (￿ = C), then for all ￿ < 1=7
there exists a threshold value w00
0 > 0 such that the ordering LC < LU < LD holds if and only if
w0 > w00
0. Otherwise, the ordering LU < LC < LD holds. Moreover, the threshold value w00
0 is
monotonically increasing in ￿.
(ii) In all remaining cases the ordering of the industry employment levels is LC = LU < LD.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 clari￿es that, while a centralised regime can lead to higher overall employment
levels than a coordinated regime in the long run, the reverse may also hold. The latter is less
likely, however, if the hold-up problem, as measured through the implementation cost I(￿), is
su¢ ciently large, given w0. More precisely, the overall employment is higher under centralisation
than under coordination if an investment project is only undertaken with a centralised regime,
but labour productivity does not increase too much. However, since the reverse can also hold, the
higher powered incentives to increase labour productivity under centralisation may eventually
come at the cost of lower industry employment than under coordinated wage setting.
3.2 Comparison with Perfectly Competitive Labour Markets
Since in policy debates over labour market reform it is often argued that policy makers
should take a more active role in deregulating labour markets, it is useful to relate our results
to the benchmark case of perfectly competitive labour markets where unionisation is completely
suppressed. Comparing our three regimes to a perfectly competitive labour market (under a
product market duopoly) yields the following result (to proceed in a parsimonious way, we
integrate the perfectly competitive labour market regime into the set of unionisation structures
as ￿ = ￿ ):
Proposition 5. Innovation incentives are strictly larger under a perfectly competitive labour
market (￿ = ￿) than under coordinated (￿ = C) or decentralised wage setting (￿ = D). However,
innovation incentives are larger under centralised wage setting (￿ = U) than under perfectly
competitive labour markets (￿ = ￿) if w0 < A=3. For all A=3 < w0 < A there exists a threshold
14value e ￿ 2 (0;1=3) such that ￿￿ > ￿U if ￿ < e ￿ and ￿￿ < ￿U if ￿ > e ￿. Moreover, e ￿ is
monotonically increasing in w0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that unionisation usually reduces innovation incentives when compared
to a perfectly competitive labour market. The only exception is the centralised regime U, where
the risk of a hold-up through wage di⁄erentiation is completely eliminated. As the union pushes
the wage rate above the competitive wage, ￿rms face a more elastic demand for their products,
which can induce higher investment activity. If, however, the reservation wage is su¢ ciently
large, this e⁄ect becomes smaller and a perfectly competitive market is likely to exhibit larger
investment incentives. Interestingly though, the centralised regime can also lead to largest
investment incentives for relatively high reservation wages if the innovation is large enough (i.e.,
￿ > e ￿ holds) in which case the uniformity rule is most e⁄ective in restricting the union￿ s hold-up
potential.
Finally, Proposition 5 sheds some light on an important empirical regularity regarding unions
and innovation reported by Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003). As the authors conclude
in their survey, empirical studies from North America consistently ￿nd strong and negative
impacts of unions on R&D. In contrast, European studies do generally not ￿nd negative e⁄ects
of unionisation on R&D. As union formation in the US mainly occurs at the ￿rm-level and,
therefore, gives rise to a decentralised unionisation structure, while unionisation is generally
more centralised in Europe, our results may help to explain those di⁄erent empirical ￿ndings.
According to Proposition 5, decentralisation should unambiguously decrease R&D investment
when compared to a competitive labour market, while the higher degrees of centralisation in
Europe may increase or decrease innovation incentives depending on the degree of wage setting
centralisation. Hence, the reported ambiguity is not only consistent with our model, but may
potentially also be explained if the degree of wage setting centralisation is taken into account as
an explanatory variable.
4 Labour Market Policy Implications
What are the implications our model has for labour market policy? At the latest since Calmfors
and Dri¢ ll (1988) the question of the optimal degree of wage setting centralisation has been
15most contentious and subject to a vigorous debate. The central questions are how labour
market organisation a⁄ects unemployment on the one hand and productivity on the other, and
relatedly, whether a change in labour market policy can induce more favourable outcomes. While
quite a number of economists argue that labour market rigidities and centralised wage setting
institutions are at the root of the unemployment problem and also responsible for the poor
economic performance of many European countries (see, e.g., Siebert, 1997), others point at
the positive dynamic e¢ ciency e⁄ects as ￿rms have stronger incentives to increase their labour
productivity when labour markets are less ￿ exible (see, e.g., Kleinknecht, 1998). While the ￿rst
line of reasoning is regularly put forward by economic experts such as the council of economic
advisers in Germany (see, e.g., Sachverst￿ndigenrat, 1998, pp. 117-27), union representatives
usually concur with the second argument and claim that wage di⁄erentiation opens the window
for wage dumping (Schmutzkonkurrenz), which reduces ￿rms￿incentives to increase their labour
productivity (see, e.g., Flassbeck and Scheremet, 1995; Soltwedel, 1997). Similar arguments
have also been put forward by Swedish trade union economists (see Rehn, 1952, and Agell,
1999).
As we have demonstrated in our model, there may be some truth in both lines of reasoning,
depending on the severity of the hold-up problem, the nature of innovation, and other factors
such as workers￿reservation wage. Therefore, and since policy makers usually care about both
employment e⁄ects and investment/productivity, it is useful to summarise our results for policy
purposes as follows:
Proposition 6. Decentralised wage setting (D) provides both larger innovation incentives
and higher employment levels than coordinated wage setting (C). Centralised wage setting (U)
provides the largest innovation incentives but results in lower employment than decentralised
wage setting (D).
In light of Proposition 6, an extension of antitrust rules to labour markets, as called for by
some economists (see, e.g., Simons, 1944; Baird, 2000; Haucap et al., 2001), may not be unwar-
ranted. A strict application of antitrust rules would mean that the formation of industry-wide
unions and collective wage agreements should not be allowed due to their monopolisation e⁄ects.
While such a prohibition may imply lower productivity, our model predicts that employment
would increase. If, however, the creation of monopoly unions is allowed for some reason, an-
other antitrust rule may come into force, namely non-discrimination rules. The requirement
16not to discriminate between ￿rms would unambiguously increase investment incentives while
employment, however, may increase or decrease as we have shown in Proposition 4.
Overall, policy makers face a trade-o⁄ between more employment and innovative activity.
Interestingly though, allowing for an industry union and wage ￿ exibility at the ￿rm-level appears
to be the least preferable regime for policy makers. While innovation incentives are lowest
under coordinated wage setting, employment may only exceed the centralised outcome at the
cost of forgone labour productivity improvements, which is particularly problematic in the face
of intensi￿ed international competition. Hence, in the light of our model labour market policy
may be well advised either to restrict union formation altogether or to impose non-discrimination
rules on collective wage agreements. Based on these accounts, we are left with the uncomfortable
￿nding that labour markets are nevertheless exempted from antitrust law.11
Let us ￿nally also brie￿ y comment on recent trends in continental Europe, and in particular
Germany, to augment centralised tari⁄ agreements by opening clauses, which allow for wage
adjustments at the ￿rm-level. In Germany, a deregulation policy towards decentralised union
structures, where independent unions compete against each other within the same industry, is
not a feasible policy option, as the German constitution and the labour law explicitly protect the
monopoly power of industry unions (for an analysis of the cartelisation e⁄ects of the German
labour market institutions, see Haucap et al., 2003). Given this institutional constraint, our
model suggests that, even though reforms which allow for di⁄erentiated wage pro￿les in highly
centralised labour markets may result in higher industry employment than a regime with uniform
wages, this tends to come at the cost of curbing innovative activity.
5 Conclusion
In unionised industries ￿rms￿incentives to innovate are determined by their own wage as well as
their competitors￿wage and the according adjustments following an innovation. In this paper we
have examined how these wage adjustments are determined under di⁄erent modes of unionisation
structures which we have di⁄erentiated according to the degree of wage setting centralisation.
11For the European Union and, e.g., Germany there is no dispute that the labour market is completely exempted
from antitrust regulations (see, e.g., Rittner, 1999). While in the United States the Pennington case has proved
that antitrust laws can be imposed on agreements between unions and employers, the overall picture is similar as
in Europe (for an assessment of the US law see, e.g., Sullivan and Grimes, 2000, pp. 716-27).
17As we have shown, ￿rms￿innovation incentives are non￿ monotone in this regard. If coordinated
wage setting is combined with strict uniform wage rules innovation incentives are largest, while
coordinated wage setting alone performs worst in terms of innovative activity. This may possibly
also help to explain why the empirical literature is generally not conclusive on the relationship
between various measures of labour market rigidity and productivity growth. The OECD, for
example, has recently concluded: ￿While higher unionisation and more co-ordinated bargaining
lead to less earnings inequality, it is more di¢ cult to ￿nd consistent and clear relationships
between those key characteristics of collective bargaining systems and aggregate employment,
unemployment, or economic growth￿(OECD, 1996, p. 2). Our results suggest to distinguish
coordinated wage regimes along the lines of wage ￿ exibility. For this purpose, it should prove
useful that the degree of centralisation is monotone in the inter￿rm wage di⁄erential, which
suggests that it should be used as an explanatory variable in a reduced form approach.
While it is conventional wisdom that rigidities in European labour markets are the main cause
for the high unemployment in Europe, we would also point to the commitment value that these
rigidities provide, as they help to reduce the hold-up problem associated with unionism. Since
conventional arguments for labour market deregulation are often based on a static framework
without innovation, they fail to capture the commitment aspects associated with di⁄erent forms
of labour market organisation. In contrast, our paper has analysed the strategic incentives
to innovate under di⁄erent modes of labour market organisation, and we have argued that
￿equal pay for equal work￿rules may be bene￿cial as they can encourage innovation. In this
case, policy makers face a trade-o⁄ between high employment and productivity when designing
labour market regulations and labour market policy more generally.
While we do not wish to over-emphasise this point, we believe that understanding the insti-
tutional complementarities of labour market organisation and innovation is crucial for discussing
the e⁄ects of labour market deregulation. The costs and bene￿ts of labour market regulation
are likely to be less clear-cut than is sometimes argued (see, for example, Siebert, 1997). While
decentralisation leads to higher employment levels in our framework, it also reduces innovation
incentives when compared with a centralised wage setting regime. An intermediate degree of
centralisation with only some (in)￿ exibility appears to be especially undesirable in the light
of our analysis. Some empirical support for this ￿nding is provided by Bassanini and Ernst
(2002) who ￿nd in a cross-country study that in countries with coordinated wage setting sys-
18tems there is a negative relationship between R&D intensity and labour market ￿ exibility, at
least for high-technology industries.
For our model, we have used the simplifying assumption that ￿rms are initially symmetric.
If, however, we assume instead that ￿rms are already asymmetric when they decide about
any innovation (they may for instance operate in regionally di⁄erentiated labour markets with
di⁄erent reservation wages prevailing), the natural question arises how wage setting systems
a⁄ect the evolution of oligopoly markets. While we have to leave a de￿nite answer to further
research, we conjecture that centralised wage setting under a uniformity rule is likely to increase
asymmetries between ￿rms, and consequently concentration, while a decentralised system may
give rise to o⁄setting e⁄ects. Other areas for further research may be to fully endogenise the
choice of labour market institutions and to analyse innovation incentives under di⁄erent degrees
of centralisation with di⁄erent bargaining patterns or union preferences.
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Derivation of Condition (1) in Assumption 1.
We ￿rst derive condition (1), which is a su¢ cient condition that ensures that all ￿rms produce
strictly positive output levels. Then we show that Assumption 1 guarantees interior equilibrium
outcomes such that the less e¢ cient ￿rm 2 has a strictly positive production quantity under all
three unionisation structures.
Assume that we face regime U, and, for the moment, also suppose that ￿rm 2 is not active.
Then, ￿rm 1￿ s optimal choice in the third stage is given by q1(w;￿) = [A ￿ w(1 ￿ ￿)]=2.
Accordingly, the union sets w to maximise its wage bill U = (1 ￿ ￿)q1(w ￿ w0) which yields
the optimal wage w(￿) = [A + w0(1 ￿ ￿)]=[2(1 ￿ ￿)]. This, however, cannot constitute an
equilibrium outcome as long as ￿rm 2￿ s labour demand remains strictly positive. Firm 2￿ s best
response function in the third stage of the game is given by q2(q1;w) = maxfA ￿ q1 ￿ w)=2;0g,
and by substituting q1(w;￿) and w(￿) we obtain that q2(q1;w) > 0 if condition (1) holds.
Hence, condition (1) is su¢ cient to exclude corner solutions under regime U where only the
e¢ cient ￿rm stays in the market.
We next show that condition (1) guarantees interior solutions under all three unionisation
structures. Under the di⁄erent structures, ￿rm 2￿ s equilibrium output levels (which are stated
in Lemma 2 below) are strictly positive for w0 < wD
0 ￿ 5A=(5 + 2￿), w0 < wC
0 ￿ A=(1 + ￿),
and w0 < wU
0 ￿ (2 + 5￿2 ￿ 5￿)A=[2(1 + ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2￿
] for D, C and U, respectively. It is
straightforward to check that w0 < wU
0 < wC
0 < wD
0 . As condition (1) is the most restrictive
one, it ensures that ￿rm 2 has strictly positive output levels under all unionisation structures.
Equilibrium Wages and Outputs under the Di⁄erent Unionisation Structures.
Lemma 1 and 2 summarise the equilibrium wages and quantities for given labour productivity
enhancing innovations, ￿:
Lemma 1. For the di⁄erent unionisation structures ￿ = D;C;U the equilibrium wages are
as follows:













(iii) Centralisation (U): wU =
(2￿￿)A+2w0(1￿￿+￿2)
4(1￿￿+￿2) for i = 1;2.
Substitution of the equilibrium wages into equations (2) and (3) gives the ￿rms￿equilibrium
20output levels.
Lemma 2. Under the di⁄erent unionisation structures ￿ = D;C;U the equilibrium produc-
tion quantities for ￿rms 1 and 2 are as follows:






















Proof of Proposition 2.
By de￿nition, l
￿










2, so that employment levels
follow immediately from Lemma 2. The calculations to prove part (ii), (iii), and the ordering of
lC
1 in part (i) are straightforward. It remains to derive the ordering of lU
1 and lD
1 in part (i) of
the proposition. Comparing lU
1 and lD






2w0(5 ￿ 3￿ + 3￿2 + 2￿3) ￿ 5A(2 ￿ 11￿ + 2￿2)
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2 ,





2 ￿ 11￿ + 2￿2
5 ￿ 3￿ + 3￿2 + 2￿3.
We have to check that w0
0 < w0 holds, which is true for the considered parameter domain
￿ 2 (0;1=3).
Proof of Proposition 3.




2(￿) for ￿ = D;C;U. Let us ￿rst compare ￿D and
￿C. We obtain ￿D = 4w0￿[2(A ￿ w0) + w0￿]=45, and ￿C = w0￿[2(A ￿ w0) + w0￿]=12, so
that ￿D > ￿C if w0 < 2A=(2 ￿ ￿), which holds by Assumption 1.
Now let us turn to the comparison of ￿U and ￿D. De￿ne a ￿ (A ￿ w0)=3, b ￿ 2￿w0=3 +
A￿=
￿
2(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2)
￿
, c ￿ 7￿w0=15, d ￿ 2￿w0=15 and e ￿ ￿w0=3+A￿(1￿￿)=
￿
2(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2)
￿
.
We can write the innovation incentives under regimes U and D as follows: ￿U = (2ab + b2 +
2ae ￿ e2)=4 and ￿D = 4(2ac + c2 + 2ad ￿ d2)=9. It follows that ￿U > ￿D if and only if
a[2(b + e) ￿ 32(c + d)=9] + b2 ￿ e2 > 16(c2 ￿ d2)=9.
For this condition to be satis￿ed, it is su¢ cient to show that the following two conditions are
jointly ful￿lled):
2(b + e) > 32(c + d)=9, (5)
b2 ￿ e2 > 16(c2 ￿ d2)=9. (6)
21Given that b+e = ￿w0 +
A￿(2￿￿)
2(1￿￿+￿2) and c+d = 3￿w0=5, (5) holds for w0 <
15A(2￿￿)
2(1￿￿+￿2), which
is implied by Assumption 1. Turning now to requirement (6) note that







1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2 +
3A2￿(2 ￿ ￿)




c2 ￿ d2 = (￿w0)2=5.
Hence, we know that (6) must be ful￿lled if
￿2w0
￿
w0 + A(1 + ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2)
￿
=3 > 16(￿w0)2=45,
which reduces to w0 <
5A(1+￿)
2(1￿￿+￿2), which again holds by Assumption 1. Hence, ￿U > ￿D
follows, and therefore, ￿U > ￿D > ￿C.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We only derive the threshold value w00
0 as the remaining comparisons are obtained by straight-
forward calculations. Suppose that ￿C < I(￿) < ￿U, which implies that the innovation is im-
plemented under regime ￿ = U but not under regime ￿ = C. Comparison of total employment
LU(￿) and LC(0) gives
LU(￿) ￿ LC(0) = ￿
￿
6
[A ￿ 2w0(1 ￿ ￿)].







0 < w0 is only true for ￿ < 1=7, we
obtain the result stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5.
We ￿rst derive the second-best innovation incentives ￿￿ with perfectly competitive labour
markets and Cournot-duopoly competition in the product market. Then we prove the second
part of the assertion which compares ￿￿ and ￿U. Then we prove the ￿rst part of the proposition.
If the labour market is perfectly competitive, then the prevailing wage rate is w￿ = w0.
Hence, the innovative ￿rm￿ s equilibrium pro￿ts are ￿1(￿) = [A￿w0(1￿2￿)]2=9. Accordingly,
second-best innovation incentives are de￿ned by ￿￿ = ￿1(￿) ￿ ￿2(￿) for which we obtain
￿￿ = w0￿[2(A ￿ w0) + w0￿]=3. Comparing ￿￿ and ￿U we obtain
￿U ￿ ￿￿ =
￿ 1(￿;w0)
48(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2)
2, with (7)
 1(￿;w0) = A2(8 ￿ 12￿ + 18￿2 ￿ 7￿3) ￿ 4Aw0(8 ￿ 16￿ + 21￿2 ￿ 13￿3 + 5￿4)
+4w2
0(6 ￿ 15￿ + 24￿2 ￿ 21￿3 + 12￿4 ￿ 3￿5).
22As the denominator is strictly positive the sign of ￿U ￿ ￿￿ is positive if
 1(￿;w0) > 0. (8)
Condition (8) is quadratic in w0, which suggests an indirect way to prove the existence of a unique
threshold e ￿(w0) > 0 such that  1(e ￿(w0);w0) = 0. Note that this also implies  1(￿;w0) > 0






4 ￿ 4￿ + 7￿2








1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2
￿
,
such that (8) holds if w0 < w0;1 or w0 > w0;2. First note that w0;2 > w0(￿) for all ￿ ￿ 0, so
that the second inequality never holds. We next show that (9) is monotonically increasing in ￿.
Calculating its derivative reveals that the sign of the derivative is determined by the expression
7￿4 ￿ 8￿3 + 3￿2 + 4￿ + 4. (10)
Note that expression (10) is strictly positive for all 0 ￿ ￿ < 1=3, so that the threshold value
w0;1 is monotonically increasing in ￿. Moreover, for ￿ = 0 we obtain w0;1 = A=3 and for
￿ = 1=3 the value w0;1 = 31(A=70). Combining the values for w0;1 at the boundaries with the
monotonicity of w0;1 in ￿ proves the existence of the unique threshold value 0 < e ￿(w0) < 1=3
and its monotonicity in w0 for all A=3 < w0 < A as asserted in the proposition.
We ￿nally show ￿￿ > ￿D holds for all 0 < ￿ < 1=3. First note that the di⁄erence ￿￿ ￿￿D






[A ￿ w0(1 ￿ ￿)] > 0.
For ￿ = 0 we get ￿￿ ￿ ￿D = 0, so that ￿￿ > ￿D holds for all 0 < ￿ < 1=3. By Proposition 3
it also follows that ￿￿ > ￿C.
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